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REPUTATION WITH RESPECT TO BOOKS
OF ORIGINAL ENTRIES
Books of original entries are made by somebody. The
assertions therein of sales made, or services rendered, are
the assertions of those who keep them. They may be true
or untrue; accurate or inaccurate. While the law allows
these entries to be used as evidence that the things occurred which are mentioned in them, e. g., the sales were made
to such and such persons of such and such articles at such
and such prices, it remembers that they are self-serving
statements, made in the absence of the persons to be charged, not made under oath, or subject to cross-examination.
Gibson, J., said, (and his dictum has been often quoted),
"Books of original entries are at best a dangerous kind
of evidence. They are admissible on grounds of necessity,
not of convenience; and the decisions in their favor have
always gone as far as expediency can require, or prudence
justify. Such books are barely competent, and although
they often afford perfectly satisfactory evidence, yet, being the act of the party using them, and affording extraordinary facilities to the practice of deception in a way
that renders detection difficult, they are entitled to no
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peculiar protection, but are liable to have their credibility
impeached by every means in the power of the opposite
''
party. 1
Reputation of the Entrant
Since the written entry is the assertion of somebody
and is used testimonially, the same infirmative evidence is
admissible, as in the case of testimony. The reputation of
the writer for inveracity, may be given in evidence. This
is true, whether the person who made the entries in the
book has appeared as a witness 2 in support of them, or
whether, being dead or out of the state3 his handwriting
as clerk is proved.
Honesty and Veracity
A curious discrimination was made, in Crouse v. Miller' between the admissibleness of proof in respect to honesty, and proof in respect to veracity. The book-keeper
was not in court, and another testified that the entries
had been made by him. The opposite party was allowed
to ask, ever the objection of the proponent, what the character of the book-keeper generally was, for honesty.
It
was urged that the question should have been only as to
veracity. Gibson, J., concedes that if he had been a witness, to support the books, "his oath might have been impeached on the ground of veracity; but I will not say that
the books might not also be impeached on the ground of
want of honesty. Here however, the books were not at1

Crouse v. Miller, 10 S. & R. 155.

2White's Estate, 11 Phila. 100; Funk v. Ely, 45 Pa. 444.
3
Crouse v. Miller, 10 S. & R. 155.
410 S. & R, 155. In Weamer v. Juart, 29 Pa. 257, a reputa.
tiou for honesty and correct book-keeping, was said to be pertinent,
because the book-keeper was not a witness, as distinguished from
truth and veracity. It would have been error to prove reputation
for truth and veracity.
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tested by his oath, but by evidence of his hand-writing;
and deriving all their claim to respect from his character,
whatever affected the one, very fairly had a direct tendency to affect the other." The book is simply the utterance of the man. If the man is unveracious, so are probably his written assertions in the book. If the man is dishonest, he has probably resorted to fictitious charges in
order to compel the party charged to pay for what he has
not got; or to pay more for what he has got, than he contracted to pay. The distinction between the man and the
book which is simply the utterances of the man is impalpable.
Honesty is, possibly, freedom from a fraudulent disSome deposition. Deception is not necessarily fraud.
ception is innocent; some, though reprehensible, does not
constitute fraud. However, fraud is often perpetrated
by falsehood. The only way in which a statement in a
book could be dishonest, would be by being false, and by
falsely asserting a debt on the part of the person charged.
The reputation of the keeper of the book for dishonesty
and for unveracity, would be equally pertinent. Hanna,
J., sensibly observes "that a party who seeks to prove his
claim by his books of original entries, not only offers for
attack and scrutiny his character for honesty, truth and
veracity." A consciously untrue charge in a book, is a
dishonest charge. It defrauds either the merchant, physician, laborer, who conducts the business in which the
book is kept, or the person who is named in it as purchaser, patient, employer. In an action of debt, on a book account, the plaintiff swore that his books were books of
original entries. It was proper to receive proof that he
was unworthy of credit on his oath. In so far as he swore
that the books were his books of original entries, his oath
What was unworthy of
was probably unquestionable.
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credit was not this statement, but the accuracy of the entries, or his statement that they were accurate.-'
Reputation for Keeping Inaccurate Books
In Weaver v. Juart6 evidence was offered of the bad
reputation of the books in the neighborhood, among those
who dealt with the firm, whose books they were, and of
the reputation of the partner, now deceased, who kept the
books, for keeping inaccurate books. It might be suspected from the remarks of Woodward, J., that it would
have been error to give evidence of the "general character"
of the book-keeper, "for truth and veracity."
It was
proper to give evidence of general character for honesty
and correct book-keeping. But incorrect book-keeping is
untrue book-keeping.
It can matter little whether one
writes many untrue entries through ignorance, or mistake, or with design.
Habitual or frequent inaccuracy
though not dishonest, should shake the credit of the book,
and of the keeper of it.
Reputation of the Book
The books may acquire a reputation for inaccuracy.
"When they have acquired a general reputation for inaccuracy-when the shopkeeper has through fraud or carelessness made false entries, or omitted true ones, so frequently as to destroy the confidence of his customers in
both himself and his books, what reason," asks Woodward, J., "is there for insisting that a jury shall trust him?
How can private entries which a whole community have
learned to discredit promote the ends of justice? They
are no more worthy of the confidence of a court and jury
than a witness whose reputation for truth and veracity
is impeached?" This reputation of the book for inaccuracy is founded on the inaccuracy of many of the entries
5

Barber v. Bull, 7 W. & S. 391.
*29 Pa. 257.
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against many persons in the community. "Like the testimony of living witnesses," said Buffington, P. J., "they
may by degrees, and from the discovery of many customers, of various and general inaccuracies, acquire such a
reputation for incorrectness as to render them quite unworthy of credit.' ' 7 One who uses a book of original entries offers for attack its reputation for accuracy.,
Showing ParticularErrors in Accounts With Others
It is said that not only may the character of the keeper of the book be attacked, but it may be shown that the
books are "notoriously unworthy of confidence," and this
may be established "by particular acts of irregularity by
The books, said the court
the plaintiff in keeping them."
"might be discredited by showing them to be notoriously
unworthy of confidence, which could not be done, however, without descending to particulars."' This seems to
teach that particular charges against A, or B, or C, may
be proven to be inaccurate, in order to shake the credit of
the entries in the book against X. "When," says Woodward, J., "a book of original entries is offered in evidence,
supported by the oath of the party, the court examines it
to see if it appears prima facie to be what it purports to
be. If there are erasures and interlineations, and false
or impossible dates, touching points that are material, or
if for any reason it clearly appears not to be a legal book of
entries, the court may reject it as incompetent * * * If this
does not clearly appear, it is to be submitted to the jury
to judge of, and then it is competent for the adverse party
to show its general character by pointing to charges and
entries affecting other parties, and by calling witnesses to
prove such entries false and fraudulent."10 Hanna, J.,
7Weamer v. Juart, 29 Pa. 257.
sWhite's Estate, 11 Phila. 100.
9
Barber v. Bull, 7 W. & S. 391; White's Estate, 11 Phila. 100.
2OFunk v. Ely, 45 Pa. 444; Fultou's Estate, 178 Pa. 78.
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observes 1 that "the evidence as to the character of books
of original entry should be confined to their general character, unless specific instances of unfair or false and dishonest entries are proposed to be proved." But the meaning of this sentence is problematical. What is "general
1
character ?"
2
It is not "general" in the sense in which the

character of an individual is general; that is, not limited
to a particular virtue or vice, but to virtues and vices ind;scriminately. The only quality of the books in contemplation, is that of accuracy, truthfulness, honesty. There
might be room to suspect that the judge meant by general
character, to refer to a characterization of the book as a
unit, as inaccurate, because of the large ratio of inaccuracies in the entire number of entries in it, as contrasted
with the exposure of inaccuracies in a considerable number
of entries, but for his own definition. For "general character," he gives as an equivalent "or common reputation in
the community or neighborhood, and among persons having dealings with him where character is sought to be impeached." After having said that "particular instances of
irregularity and false charges may be proved," he adds,
mystifyingly, "The individual opinions and personal knowledge of the witnesses derived from private transactions
(all the transactions are private transactions) are always
to be excluded." How then is the falseness of the particular "false charges" to be proved?
Judge Hanna remarks that "the testimony of witnesses
is not to be confined to the single book admitted in evidence, for that may contain only the charges in dispute,
but may extend over a period of years, and through a series of books of accounts."
He proceeds to say that "the
"'White's Estate, 11 Phila. 100.
12The expression is used by Woodward, J., who remarks "general character is formed by numerous particulars." Hanna, T.,
also says "Particular instances of irregularity and false charges
may be proved to discredit the books, and show them to be unre-

liable."
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investigation should be restricted to a reasonable limit;
confined to general reputation of the books for accuracy
and honest dealing, at or about the time, or within a reasonable period before or subsequent to the time the alleged
indebtedness was contracted." Does this mean that the
reputation must exist during the period named, or that
the entries during the period named must be the subject of
the reputation? Suppose the effort to collect the debts
charged are not made for a year or two after the close of
the series of charges, and the knowledge of persons charged of the nature of these charges does not exist until then.
Is the reputation then engendered not to be conidered?
Scope of Time During Which Entries May Be Investigated
While entries against other persons may be investigated, in a suit on a book of original entries against X,
Woodward, J., remarks "That this investigation may not
run into excessive departure from the issue on trial, the
court should limit it to the time ,or near the time covered
by the account in suit, and should suffer no more examination of collateral cases than would bear directly on the genAccounts against others
eral character of the book."
than X, which are running contemporaneously with the
account against X, may be examined with a view to discovering inaccuracies that would discredit the book even
as respects the account against X, but parts of accounts
which run before the commencement, or after the close of
the account against X are not to be considered,13to avoid
an "excessive departure from the issue on trial.
Visible Features of the Record
Certain characteristics of the account may be visible
to an inspection, which will justify the rejection by the
court of the account. "If there are erasures," says Wood,sFunk v. Ely, 45 Pa. 444.
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ward, J., "and interlineations, and false or impossible
dates, touching points that are material, or if for any reason, it clearly appears not to be a legal book of entries, the
court may reject it as incompetent. Even if the court has
admitted the book, if it exhibits, in respect to customers
generally, illegal dates, as on Sunday, or impossible dates
as 31st of June or 30th February, or altered dates, or earlier dates after those that are later, or any other such condemning features, they are evidence for the jury upon the
general character of the book. The jury may forii. some
opinion from such examination, how far it is entitled to
weight in the scales which they are holding. Whilst they
should make all due allowances for mistakes, for ignorance
and unskilfulness in book-keeping, and for peculiarities in
the plaintiff's business, they should insist on the general
honesty and accuracy of the book, made in secret by one
party against the other, and now offered as a guide to the
conscience of the jury."14
Funk v. ElY
It may be profitable to review with some detail this
case. John and Solomon Ely had been partners prior to
the spring of 1861, in the meat business. With them Funk
had dealt. The plaintiffs defended largely on their book
of original entries. The defendant attempted to show that
in a suit against M., the Elys had used as their book of
original entries, a different book from that used in the
present suit. Why this evidence was rejected does not appear. The supreme court seems not to find error in the
rejection. The trial court rejected evidence that the Elys
after dissolving partnership left the books in the hands of
one of the partners, Solomon, for collection. He has submitted the books to the customers of the firm for settlement
of their accounts, and thereby they have acquired a "no24Funk v. Ely, 45 Pa. 444.
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toriously bad reputation for honesty and accuracy among
all the customers of the firm, and throughout the entire
community." It allowed only evidence of the general character of the books, and of Solomon Ely, the book-keeper,
to be given in connection with the character of the books,
until the time the present suit was instituted. Nothing in
the opinion of the Supreme Court indicates dissatisfaction
with this refusal to admit evidence of the reputation of the
book for numerous inaccuracies. In White's Estate, 5
the auditor found the general reputation of the claimant's
book for accuracy, and his character (reputation?) for
truth. and veracity, to be bad, and therefore, with the approval of the court, disregarded the book of original entries.
The court rejected the defendant's evidence as to the
character of Solomon Ely, the book-keeper, and his books
for honesty and correctness, both of general reputation,
and of particular facts relative to the accounts
contained in the books, such as known false entries, entries
on the Sabbath day, and upon impossible dates, and other
inaccuracies. The court allowed defendant to prove the
general character of the books for accuracy and honesty,
and, in connection with them, the general character of
Solomon Ely for honesty and truth. The court refused to
allow any evidence to be given in reference to any other
accounts than the one against the defendant. The Supreme Court says that Solomon Ely in swearing to the
book of entries, put his general character for truth and
veracity in evidence. The general character of the book
for honesty and accuracy was also put in evidence. But
what the "general character" of the book was in the
1511 Phila. 100. Buffington, J., allowed proof of the general
bad character of the book for accuracy in the neighborhood to be
given. Books may, he says, "acquire such a reputation for incorrectness as to render them quite unworthy of credit" A judgment for the defendant was affirmed. Weamer v. Juart, 29 Pa. 257.
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thought of Woodward, J., does not clearly appear. Perhaps it was the character for both, of entries not specifically against the defendant, but against other customers.
It was hardly general reputation, i. e. reputation pervading a considerable part of the community. It was
error to confine the inquiry to the accuracy of the charges
against the defendant. It was error to exclude the entries against others than the defendant, on impossible
dates, on the Sabbath day, etc.
The court refused to affirm a point of the defendant,
that if the book produced at the trial as the book of original entries was purchased in 1860, after the transactions
with the defendant, the book cannot be a book of original
entries. The court found no evidence that the book had
been bought in 1860.
The court stated to the jury that the defendant had
had every opportunity to impeach the "general character
of the books" and of Solomon Ely in connection with
them, but had offered no evidence on that subject.
The court in its charge named several witnesses who,
for the defendant, had testified to another book than the
one used by the plaintiffs in the trial. One of them said
a charge originally of 42 cents had become, when he saw
it a second time, a charge of $2.00. The court remarks
that there was no evidence that the account sued on, was
embraced in that book, and hence the evidence is apparently not very pertinent. He directs the jury however,
to give the evidence the weight which in their opinion it deserves. The judgment for the plaintiff was reversed.
Barber v. Bull 6
This was an action of debt on a book account. The
plaintiff testified that books were books of original entries, and they were put in evidence. Defendant proved
167 W. & S. 391.
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that plaintiff was unworthy of credit, and that his books
were "notoriously unworthy of confidence." He established this unworthiness by particular acts of irregularity
in keeping the books. The judgment for the defendant
was affirmed.
7
Crouse v. Miller

Defendant proved as a set-off, cash paid, and goods
sold to the plaintiff. His books of original entries had
been kept by Charles B. Crouse who was absent in another state. His hand-writing was proved. The court
allowed a witness for the plaintiff to state what the character of Crouse, for honesty, generally, was. The judgment for the plaintiff was affiihmed.
7
White's Estate

A dentist presented a claim against the estate of
White in the Orphans' Court. The auditor admitted the
dentist's book of original entries, but, finding the reputation of the dentist for truth and veracity to be bad, and
the "general reputation of the book for accuracy to
be bad," he disregarded the book and disallowed so much
of the claim as depended on it. The action of the auditor
was sustained by the court, which says that one who offers a book to sustain a claim "not only offers for attack
and scrutiny his character for honesty, truth and veraciv, as well as the reputation of his books for accuracy
arid upright dealing."
'L10 S. & R. 155.
1811 Phila. 100.
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MOOT COURT
HENDERSON'S ESTATE
Wills--Revocation of Codicil-Effect of Defective Execution of the
Revoking Codicil
STATEMENT OF FACTS
John Henderson left a will, one bequest of which was "I give
to my brother John, $10,000." He subsequently executed a codicil
without any subscribing witnesses in which he said "The $10,000
I have given absolutely to John, I hereby give to him for the term
of his natural life only, and after his death, I give it to the Good
Samaratin Hospital."
The auditing judge has held the codicil void, and has awarded
the $10,000 to John absolutely.
Lee, for plaintiff.
Lichtenstein, for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
LAROSSA, J. The fundamental and cardinal rule in the interpretation of wills is that the intention of the testator, if not
inconsistent with some established rule of law, or with public policy must govern. Waelpper's Appeal, 126 Pa. 572.
It is a rule of law that charitable or religious institutions must
bring themselves within the purview of the act of 1855, in claiming bequests or devises.
The purpose of this act is plain, and indeed mandatory, and wants
to make reasonably sure that testamentary gifts to religion or
charity were the result of deliberate intent of the testator and were
not coerced from him while in a weakened physical condition under
the influence of the doubts and errors of impending death. Paxon's
Estate, 221 Pa. 98.
It therefore follows that the residuary estate given to the hospital was void because the codicil which so provided for this estate was not executed as required by the act of April 26, 1855,
P. L. 328, 1 Purd. 595.
But, the auditing judge has held the codicil void; this is clearly in error.
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The provision in the codicil which created the life estate was a
valid testamentary disposition of the property and vested in the
life tenant. Anderson's Estate, 243 Pa. 34.
It is clear that the purpose of the testator was to provide for
the legatee, John, during his life only.
The codicil clearly and unequivocally imparts the intention of
the testator. He said: "The $10,000 I have given absolutely to
John, I hereby give to him for the term of his natural life only,
and, after his death, I give it to the Good Samaratin Hospital."
The life estate was not created for any illegal purpose, nor
to carry out an illegal scheme-the testator simply wished and
willed, like all philanthropists, that his money should serve successive roles. The last role in which this money was to play is prohibited for the reasons heretofore given and therefore required disposition other than as planned by its donor.
The codicil being incompatible with the original bequest, revoked, by necessary implication of law, so much of the will as originally provided for the bequest to John, and since a portion of the
codicil is inoperative, it follows that the testator had died intestate insofar as concerns that portion of the codicil that has failed,
and the fund must be distributed according to the intestate laws of
the state. Anderson's Estate, supra; Hock's Estate, 154 Pa. 422.
Decree accordingly.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
In 12 D. L. R. 187 it is said: "While a * * * codicil which is
not executed as the law requires for wills, generally, cannot even
revoke an earlier will, if complying with the general law of wills,
it is vulnerable merely because, giving property for charitable or
religious uses, it does not observe the requirements of the act of
1855, it will revoke the earlier will though its provisions four charities cannot be carried out."
This principle was applied in Anderson's Est., 243 Pa. 34, where
it was held that "a codicil cutting down an absolute estate given
in a prior codicil, to a life estate will revoke the prior codicil, although by reason of the defective execution of the later codicil a
gift over to a charitable use contained therein cannot take effect."
The decision of the learned below is justified by these authorities and by the decisions in Teacles Appeal, 153 Pa. 219; Appeal of Lutheran Church, 113 Pa. 32.
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WILSON v. RAILWAY CO.
Common Carriers--Degree of Care Required in Transporting a Passenger Known To Be Intoxicated
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Wilson, while on the car of the defendant, became more and
At
more intoxicated from liquor drunk before boarding the car.
a certain point he signalled to be allowed to get off. The car
was stopped at a place where had he been sober he could have
alighted with safety. The conductor, though aware of his condition,
did not assist him until he reached the road. He fell and seriously
hurt himself. The court told the jury that a passenger could not
so enfeeble himself by his own indulgence and in consequence, impose the duty of greater care on a conductor than that which he
owed to persons who were sober. It also stated that becoming
drunk and so superinducing -the injury was contributory negligence. Verdict for defendant. Motion for a new trial.
Holderbaum, for plaintiff.
Kane, for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
HENDRICKS, J. The first instruction of the court to
which the plaintiff excepts is that a passenger could not by his
own indulgence so enfeeble himself and, as a consequence, impose
upon the conductor the duty of greater care than that which he
owed to persons who were sober.
The carrier is bound to guard the passenger from every danAlthough carriers of
ger which extreme vigilance can prevent.
passengers do not warrant absolute safety, they are bound to exThe slightest
ercise the utmost degree of diligence and care.
neglect resulting in hurt or loss, against which human foresight
and prudence may guard renders carriers of passengers liable.
Smedley v. Hesterville, etc., R. R., 184 Pa. 620; Meier v. Pa. R. R.,
64 Pa. 225; People's Passenger Rwy. v. Weiller, 17 W. N. C. 306;
Sullivan v. P. and R .R., 30 Pa. 234; Laing v. Calder, 9 Pa. 479.
A carrier is not bound to accept as a passenger without an attendant, one who, because of physical or mental disability, is unable to take care of himself, but having so accepted such person,
his inability to care for himself rendering special care and assistance necessary, the carrier will be held responsible if such care
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and assistance are not offered. 5 A. and E. Encyc., 538. The
degree of care to be exercised in such a case is that which is reas4
onable for the safety of the passenger in view of his mental and
physical condition. 5 A. and E. Encyc.. 538. This rule was held"
to apply to intoxicated persons in Wheeler v. Grand Trunk Rwy.
Co., 50 AtI. 103; Fisher v. W. Va. and Pittsburg R. R. Co., 23
L. R. A. 758.
It was further held in the former case that if the plaintiff
had not been a drunken passenger on the car, but a drunken trespasser on the track, it would not be denied that the duty would
have arisen to take such precautions as were proper to avoid an
accident. Surely a drunken passenger is entitled to not less care
and precaution against injury. Where a carrier accepts an intoxicated person as a passenger, who is incapable of caring for or
preventing injury to himself, knowing him to be in that condition
or later becoming aware of the fact, without putting him off, and
then fails to exercise such care as a reasonably prudent man would
exercise under such circumstances to prevent him from injuring
himself, the company is liable for the injuries occasioned.
This brings up the question whether reasonable care was used
and we think this is a matter for the jury. Whether under the
circumstances the care which the defendant owed to the plaintiff
was such, that by its exercise the injury would have been prevented, is a matter for the jury alone. There is no absolute test fixed
by law by which the measure of care required in a particular case
can be determined. The only standard is to be found in the carefully considered, dispassionate judgment of the jury in view of all.
Therefore, without taking up the
the circumstances of the case.
matter further, we think the learned court erred in giving this instruction, as the question what exact amount of care the defendant
company owed the plaintiff was for the jury to decide.
The second instruction excepted to was that getting drunk and
so superintending the injury was contributory negligence.
The conductor did not assist the plaintiff in alighting until he
reached the road. "The carrier is bound to exercise care in secur'ng the safety of the passengers in boarding and alighting from
its cars and the degree of care required in this duty is the highest care." 6 Cyc. 611. "In general there is no duty to assist a
passenger in entering or alighting from the car, unless there is
some unusual danger or difficulty, unless the passenger is to the
knowledge of the servants of the carrier, infirm or under some
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disability." 6 Cyc. 611. Therefore we do not doubt that the conductor's failure to assist the plaintiff, was negligence.
If the defendants, with knowledge of the plaintiff's condition,
in the performance of the duty owed by them, could have prevented
the injury, they were bound to do so; and their breach of duty would
be the cause of the injury. If the plaintiff could not have prevented the injury to himself, and the defendants could by the care
the situation required of them, they are liable if they did not, although the plaintiff's inability arose from his prior negligence or
If due care on the part of either at the time of the
intoxication.
injury would prevent it, the antecedent negligence of one or both of
the parties is immaterial, except as it may be one of the circumstances by which the requisite measure of care is to be determined.
In such a case the law deals with their behavior in the situation in
which it finds them at the time the mischief is done, regardless
of their prior misconduct. To support this we have Nashua Iron
and Steel Co. v. Worcester and N. R., 62 N. H. 159; Coasting Co.
v. Tolson. 139 U. S. 551; R. R. Co. v. Ives, 144 U. S. 408
If the negligence of the passenger is known to the servants of
the carrier, and by the exercise of the degree of care required of
carriers for the protection of their passengers, the injury likely
to result from such negligence might have been avoided, then the
carrier is liable for the fault of his servant in not avoiding such
injury, such fault being deemed the proximate cause thereof, while
the negligence of the passenger becomes the remote cause. 6 Cyc.
641.
While drunkenness will not excuse exercise of due care on the
plaintiff's part, still if plaintiff was so drunk that he was not properly able to take care of himself, and defendants knew of his condition in time to prevent the accident and did not use due care to
prevent it, they were in fault. In this case where defendants were
not obliged to accept plaintiff as a passenger in the condition he was,
still, if they did accept him when they knew he was so far under
the influence of liquor, or if they permitted him to remain on the
car after they became aware of his condition, it was their duty to
use due care to prevent injury.
Where defendant's answer is that the plaintiff's incapacity was
caused by his voluntary intoxication, if it were established that the
plaintiff's incapacity and irresponsibility were known to the defendants, the cause of his intoxication is entirely immaterial. Intoxication will not of itself prevent a recovery. Maguire v. R. R.
Co., 115 Mass. 239; Kean v. R. R. Co., 61 Md. 154; R. R. Co.
v. Cooper, 120 Ind. 469.
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Therefore we think that when the conductor of the defendant
company failed to assist the plaintiff in alighting he failed to exercise the degree of care required of carriers for the protection
of their passengers, and since by the exercise of such care, the injury likely to result from the known intoxication of the plaintiff
might have been avoided, but was not, on account of said failure of
the conductor in his duty, that became the proximate cause of the
injury and the defense of contributory negligence can not be set up.
However, we need not go further, as it is clearly the province
of the jury to decide as to the proximate and remote causes of an
injury, and as to contributory negligence. The plaintiff is entitled
to every fact and every inference of fact which might have been
found by the jury or drawn by them from the testimony befcre
them. If there is a reasonable doubt as to the facts or the inferen.
ces to be drawn from them ,it is the province of the jury to determine it. Lewis v. Wood, 247 Pa. 545; D. L. and W. R. R. Co.
v. Jener, 128 Pa. 308.
In Pennsylvania the rule has long been established that the
question as to whether or not the intoxication of the plaintiff was
the proximate cause of the injury is a question for the jury. Munley v. Hull, 3 Lack. J. 277; Hershey v. Mulcreek Twp., 9 AtI. 452.
Therefore in view of the cited cases and the conclusions drawn
from them, we think that both assignments or error should be
sustained and a venire facias de novo should be granted.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
Further discussion of this case is rendered unnecessary by
the able opinion of the learned court below. Cf. Warren v. Railway Co., 243 Pa. 15.
Affirmed.

BALLOCK v. HENGST
Sales--Interpretation of Contract, Whether Divisible or Indivisible
STATEMENT OF FACTS
For a consideration, i. e., the surrender of a certain right by
Hengst, Ballock agreed to supply Hengst during July with 100 barrels of flour, and during August with 140 barrels, at $9 per barrel.
Ballock supplied in July 60 barrels and none in August. Hengst,
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though he received the flour in July and sold it for $11 per barrel, declined to pay for it, contending the contract was entire,
and would not have been entered into for any less than 240 barrels. The court took this view. Verdict for the defendant.
Burd, for plaintiff.
Gangewer, for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
AYLESWORTH, J.
The first question arising from these
facts is whether the contract entered into by Ballock and Hengst
is entire or divisible. A contract is entire when by its terms,
nature, and purposes, it contemplates and intends that each and
all of its parts, material provisions, and the consideration, are common each to the other and interdependent.
A divisible contract is one in its nature and purposes susceptible of division and apportionment, having two or more parts in
respect to matters and things contemplated and embraced by it,
not necessarily dependent upon each other, nor is it intended by
the parties that they shall be.
The Sales Act of 1915, Sec. 76, P. L. 564, defines a divisible
contract as follows: "Divisible contract to sell or sale means a contract to sell or a sale in which by its terms the price for a portion
or portions of the goods less than the whole is fixed or ascertainable by computation."
But these definitions do not decide the point. The question
as to whether a contract is entire or divisible has arisen in a variety of ways, and it seems that the decisions of the courts as to how
such contracts should be construed in particular ca:es have frequently been made to depend somewhat upon the purpose for which the
question was invoked.
The well settled rule of construction, however, is that the
intention of the parties must govern, Shinn v. Bodine, 60 Pa. 182,
and this must be ascertained by the ordinary rules of construction,
considering not only the language of the contract, but also, in cases
of uncertainty, the subject matter, the situation of the parties,
and the circumstances surrounding the transaction. The question
does not depend solely or necessarily upon the nature of the sub.
ject matter of the sale, Rigg v. Moore, 110 Pa. 236, its divisibility,

Shinn v. Bodine, supra, or the multiplicity of the articles or items
composing it, Rigg v. Moore, supra.
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It is ordinarily presumed that the intention of the parties is
expressed by the writing; that it contains the whole contract; and
that a person means what his language, by its terms, and under
the circumstances under which it is used, would be fairly understood to mean, and this presumption cannot be rebutted by proof
that he intended something more or different, which he made no
attempt to express, and which a person dealing with him neither
understood nor had reason to understand.
When the language of the agreement is doubtful, so that it
is susceptible of two constructions, one of which makes it fair,
customary, and such as prudent men would naturally execute, while
the other makes it inequitable, unusual, or such as reasonable men
would not be likely to enter into, the interpretation which makes it
a rational and probable agreement will be preferred to that which
makes it an unusual, unfair or improbable contract. In the present case, Ballock agreed to supply Hengst during July with 100 barrels of flour and during August with 140 barrels. We think it a
fair presumption that the parties intended to contract for the aggregate 240 barrels. But in arriving at the intention of the parties
the nature of the subject matter is to be considered, and also the
nature of the consideration.
Ordinarily a contract for the sale of goods by the pound, bushel,
ton, etc., at so much per pound, bushel, or ton is considered divisible. For instance, a contract to sell 5000 tons of coal at $3 per
ton is divisible, whereas a contract to sell 5000 tons of coal for
$15,000 is entire. But this latter case does not seem to be true
under the definition of divisible contract given in the Sales Act
(quoted above), which says it is divisible if the price of any portion can be ascertained by computation. If the subject matter
of the sale is regarded by the parties as being in the nature of
one entire thing, or the sale is of a specified quantity or amount,
the contract is entire, although such goods consist of separate lots,
parcels, or packages, and are priced separately, or according to
certain standards of weight or measurement, Shinn v. Bodine, supra,
and even the fact that different prices per pound are fixed by
the contract will not necessarily render the contract divisible.
In some cases it has been held that the character of a contract
of sale as entire or divisible should be determined chiefly by the
character of the consideration. Rigg v. Moore, supra. And the
rule has been adopted that where the sale is for a gross price,
that is, where the consideration is entire, the contract is entire.
If the contract is for the sale of several distinct things, but all for
-one consideration, it is entire. Roberts v. Beatty, 2 P. and W. 63,
21 Am. Dec. 418; The Lucesco Oil Co. v. Brewer et al, 66 Pa. 33,.
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The subsidiary provisions as to -delivery of stated quantities i
different months, do not split up the contract into as many con.
tracts as there shall be deliveries of so many distinct quantities of
flour. Mersey Steel Co. v. Naylor, 9 App. Cas. 434, Eng. The
mere fact that the articles sold are to be delivered in instalments
does not of itself render divisible a contract otherwise entire,
Norrington v. Wright, 115 U. S. 188. From all this we can come
to no other conclusion than that this contract is entire.
Now then having seen, that the contract under consideration is
entire, what will be the effect of the delivery of a smaller quantity
than that stipulated in the agreement? Under Sec. 44 of the Uniform Sales Act, a defect in quantity is a breach going to the essence, and the buyer, except under special circumstances of custom or contract, cannot be compelled to accept a quantity different
from that for which he bargained. Where the seller is under a
contract to deliver a specific quantity of goods and tenders a
smaller quantity, the buyer may reject the tender. Norrington
v. Wright, supra. The buyer may, however, accept the offer though
defective. But in case the seller's obligation is either by its terms
or by the buyer's permission performable in instalments it may
happen that the buyer, not supposing the seller is going to be
guilty of a breach of contract, accepts one or more instalments,
assuming that the rest are to follow. If the contract is divisible
there is no doubt that the seller can recover the price of the portion delivered. But if the contract is entire, the price is not due
until full performance. If the buyer knows no more is to be delivered, then there is no difficulty in finding a real contract to
pay for them, since the partial delivery was in effect a new offer.
But if the deficient quantity of the goods were delivered under such
circumstances that the buyer was not aware that full delivery
would not be made, no new contract can be said to have been agreed
to by the buyer. Here accordingly, if the seller recovers payment
for what he has furnished, it must be on principles of quasicon
tract. It is true that it has often been laid down that a contract
will not be implied by the law in favor of one who is in default
under an express contract, but the injustice of allowing the buyer
to retain the benefit of goods without paying for them is so clear
that even in England where quasi-contract rights are generally
most strictly limited, recovery has been allowed, Oxendale v.
Wetherell, 9 R. and C., 386, and the weight of authority in this
country strongly supports this view. Shaw v. Badger, 12 S. &
R. 275; Richards v. Shaw, 67 Ill. 222; Hedden v. Roberts, 134 Mass.
38; Clark v. Moore, 3 Mich. 55.; Holden Mill v. Westervelt, 67 Me.
446.
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But in New York and a few other states the seller is denied relief. The New York rule is illustrated by the case of Catlin v.
Tobias, 26 N. Y. 217, 84 Am. Dec. 183, holding that where goods
are received and used by the vendee under a contract for the delivery of specified quantities in each of three successive months, the
quantity delivered being less than that required by the contract,
such breach is a bar to an action by the vendor for the price of
goods delivered. The vendee under such a contract has a right to
expend the goods delivered, as required in his business, without
waiting for the expiration of the month to see whether the ven.
dor will fully perform his contract,' and such use is no waiver of
his defense in case of the vendor's breach of contract.
The doctrine of this case is followed in Pennsylvania by the
case of Producers Coke Co. v. Hillman, 243 Pa. 313, the facts of
which bear a remarkable similarity to those in the present case.
There the defendants gave up their rights under an earlier contract in consideration of a new agreement by whic. plaintiff agreed
to supply the defendants with 3,680 tons of coke at $2.379 per
ton during the month of July, and 2,124 tons at $2.345 per ton
for the months of August, September, October, November, and
tons
December. The plaintiff had delivered during July 844
less than the amount called for, and had failed to deliver any coke
whatever during the month of September. Suit was brought to recover for coke delivered during July. It was held that the contract was entire and that there could be no recovery by the plaintiff for partial performance.
This case of Producers Coke Co. v. Hillman, 243 Pa. 313, is in
conflict with the case of Shaw v. Badger, 12 S. & R. 275, where
the court permitted a: recovery for partial performance, but allowed the defendants a set-off of damages founded upon the nondelivery of the other portion contracted for. Shaw v. Badger was
followed and approved in Hubler v. Tanney, 5 Watts 51. The decision is in accord with the weight of authority in this country.
The measure of damages in such an action is not necessarily
the contract price, even if the contract fixes a price by number,
weight or measure. If the buyer retained the goods, having it in
his power to redeliver them after he knew that the seller was going
to make default in delivering the whole amount, it seems just that
the buyer should pay the contract price. The buyer, however, may
in good faith have dealt with the goods in such a way as to make
it impossible for him to return them, and yet the value of the
portion received may not be so large a proportion of the total price
as the goods are of the total amount of goods which should have
been delivered. As the buyer's obligation is imposed by lat, the
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extent of it should be restricted to the benefit which the defendant
has received. The seller, being a wrongdoer in failing to deliver
the whole amount, can certainly claim no more than this. In the
present case, the price at which the defendant sold the flour represents the fair value of it to him.
The doctrine set forth in Shaw v. Badger has been embodied
in our new Sales Act which took effect Jan. 1, 1916.
See Sec.
44 of the Act, P. L. 555, and Williston on Sales, pp. 786-790.
Sec. 44 provides: "Where the seller delivers to the buyer a quantity of goods less than he contracted to sell, the buyer may reject
them, but if the buyer accepts or retains the goods sa delivered
knowing that the seller is not going to perform the contract in full,
he must pay for them at the contract price. If, however, the
buyer shall not be liable for more than the fair value to him
that the seller is not going to perform his contract in full the
buyer shall not be liable for more than the fair value to him
of the goods so delivered."
The defences and remedies of the buyer are provided in Sec.
69, P. L. 562. The first method suggested is applicable to the
present case. "Where there is a breach of warranty by the seller,
the buyer may, at his election (a) accept or keep the goods and
set up against the seller, the breach of warranty by way of recoupment in diminution or extinction of the price."
So we cannot follow the decision in Producers Coke Co. v. Hillman, 243 Pa. 313, which was decided in 1914 before the passage
of the Uniform Sales Act in this State.
In summing up we find that the contract in the present case
was entire; that under Sec. 44 the plaintiff is entitled to recover;
that the measure of damages is the fair value of the goods to the
buyer; that the buyer can set off the damages, although unliquidated, which he has sustained by reason of the breach of the contract; that the amount of damages and set-off is a question for
the jury.
We therefore decree that the judgment of the court below be
reversed and that a venire facias de novo be awarded.
Judgment reversed with v. f. d. n.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
For a consideration Ballock bound himself to deliver 240 barrels of flour to Hengst at $9 per barrel. He has delivered 60 barrels, and no more. He wants to recover $540, for the barrels delivered.
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Had Hengst known when he accepted and retained the 60
barrels, that Ballock was "not going to perform the contract in
full," he would be obliged to pay for the barrels received at the
contract price. §44, Act relating to the sale of goods, P. L. 1915
p. 543. It does not appear that he thus knew. We assume then,
that he did not. This duty therefore does not arise.
The 44th section proceeds to say that if the buyer had used
or disposed of the portion of the goods delivered "before he knows
that the seller is not going to perform his contract in full, the buyer
shall not be liable for more than the fair value to him of the goods
so received."
The act does not say that he shall be liable for "the fair value,"
etc., but merely that he shall not be liable -for more than that
value. If any distinct intention existed, for the adoption of this
negative phrase, it was probably to provide for the recouping of
damages for the non-completion of performance by the vendor.
As tfie vendee sold the 60 barrels for $2 per barrel more than
he paid, the price named in the contract, $9, is probably the "Tair
value to him." But the non-fulfilment of the contract, in refusing
to deliver the remaining 180 barrels, has probably caused a loss to
Hengst. This loss he may show, and set it off against the $540.
The able opinion of the court below well sustains its judgment.
Affirmed.

COLLINS v. TRUST CO.
Pledge By Agent-Right of Recovery by Owner of Pledged Property
Against the Pledgee
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Mrs. Collins owning stock in a shoe company executed to Hobson. a broker, a blank power ofl attorney to assign the stock, Hobson undertaking to sell the stock for her and account for the proceeds. Hobson, pretending to own it, obtained a loan of $2,000
upon it from the Trust Co., pledging it as security with the power
to sell on notice. The notice was given and sale made for just
enough to pay the loan to the Trust Co. When the Trust Co. obtained the pledge it had no knowledge of Mrs. Collins' ownership,
but acquired such knowledge before it made the sale. The day
following the sale the Trust Co. sold the stock at an advance of
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$250. This is a bill to compel the Trust Co. to pay (a) the whole
of the money obtained by the sale by it, or (b) so much thereof as
exceeds the debt for which Hobson pledged it.
York, for the plaintiff.
Bourquin, for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
K. VAUGHN, J. We will discuss the case from the two questions presented by the bill (1) whether the plaintiff is entitled to
the amount of the pledge; (2) whether the plaintiff is entitled to
the $250 excess, realized by the Trust Co. in its resale of the
stock.
(1). Mrs. Collins executed to her broker a blank power to assign without any qualification. It is now well established in Pennsylvania that where the true owner of property holds out another
or allows him to appear as the owner of, or having full power of
disposition over, that property, and innocent third parties are thus
led into dealing with such apparent owner, they will be protected.
Their rights do not in such cases depend upon the actual title or
authority of the party with whom they deal directly. but are derived from the act of the real owner. This rule is more often
stated, that where one of two parties must suffer from the wrongful act of a third person, the party who clothes that third person
with power to perpetrate the wrong must suffer rather than the
innocent party who is deceived and imposed upon. Penna. R. Co.'s
Appeal, 86 Pa. 80; Burton's Appeal, 93 Pa. 214; Shattuck v. Am. Cement Co., 205 Pa. 197; Woods' Appeal, 92 Pa. 379, 16 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 727.
When the stock was pledged the Trust Co. believed that the
ownership was in Hobson, -the broker. It is clear that the defendant is not liable for the amount of the pledge (viz. the $2,000).
This is abundantly supported by Burton's Appeal, and Shattuck
v. American Cement Co., supra. In the former the owner of stock
lift his certificates with a broker accompanied with a blank power
of attorney to sell and transfer the same. The broker pledged them
for his own debt to one who had no knowledge of the real ownership, and the court held that such real owner was estopped from
setting up his ownership against the innocent pledgee. Again,
in the latter case, the owner of stock gave to his brokers certificates of stock owned by him, but standing in the name of other
parties, with blank assignments and power to make transfers
endorsed by the registered owners. The brokers betrayed the
confidence imposed in them, and the court decided that the owner
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of the stock must suffer rather than the innocent third party.
In the cases cited by the plaintiff which hold the opposite to
the proposition discussed above the third party had either actual
knowledge of the real ownership or there were circumstances such
as to put him on inquiry. The Trust Co. in the present case did
not obtain knowledge until after the pledge had been made. Mrs.
Collins was bound by the act of her broker and is not entitled to
the amount of the pledge.
(2). The second question relates to whom the $250 excess
belongs. This second sale was made after the Trust Co. had realized the full sum given by them to Hobson, and after they obtained
knowledge of Mrs. Collin's ownership. While it is clear that the
defendant should not be compelled to suffer because of the wrong
of the broker, it is equally clear that it should not be permitted
to profit from that wrong. What it realized above its own debt
should go to the plaintiff to repair her in a way for the loss she
has suffered. If the owner of property has conferred the indicia
of ownership upon the pledgor he can recover only the proceeds
in excess of the amount for which it was pledged. 31 Cyc. 843;
Judgment is given accordingly for the plaintiff in the sum of
$250.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
The defendant loaned $2000 on the security of the stocks,
believing and having justification given by Mrs. Collins, its owner,
for believing, that it belonged to Hobson, the broker, to whom
the $2000 were lent. The Trust Company had a right then, to make
a sale nf the stocks, in order to secure repayment of the loan. Notice from Mrs. Collins, that the stock was hers, and not Hobson's
was too late. It could not divest the Trust Company's right to
sell it. This the learned court below concedes and decides.
If the sale had been to a stranger, even with notice of the
circumstances, he would have become the absolute owner of the
stocks. He would have been under no duty to account for so much
of its price as exceeded the $2000.
Under the circumstances, the purchase by the Trust Company,
the pledgee, clothed it with the right which a stranger purchasing
it would have had. The learned court below thinks that, since the
Company was apprised of Mrs. Collin's interest before it made the
sale, it was under a duty to be satisfied with the recovery of the
$2000. So, probably, it should. So thought Stewart, J., in Colonial
Trust Co. v. Central Trust Co., 243 Pa. 268, but the majority of
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the court thought otherwise, or at least decide as if they did. IT%
this we must follow the multitude to do evil.
Judgment reversed.

HAMMOND v. ICE MFG. CO.
Action For Damages For Injuries Sustained in Foreign Jurisdiction-Applicability of the Law of the Foreign State
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Hammond, while employed by the defendant, an Ontario Canadian Corporation, operating in Canada, was injured by the negligence of a fellow employee, concurring in the unsafeness of the
The law of
place where the plaintiff was appointed to work.
Canada exempts the employer from liability for the negligence of
a fellow employee, but imposes on the employer the unconditional
duty to furnish a safe place to work. The trial court held: (a)
the law of Ontario regulates the liability for an accident happening there; '(b) an action can be maintained here for an injury
caused there; (c) the fact that the accident resulted from the
combined operation of the fellow-employee's negligence, and that
of the employer, does not preclude liability by the latter.
Puderbaugh, for plaintiff.
Sheedy, for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
PUHAK, J. With us foreign defendants may be sued. Wharton on International Law. p. 738 * * * "If a defendant can be summoned in this the jurisdiction, it is no bar to the action that he
is an alien, or that the cause of action arose abroad;" and in §707
-in discussing to what extent this principle is pushed in certain
cases-he writes: "In other respects, however, -the practise of taking jurisdiction in all transitory suits in which the defendant is
summoned in this the jurisdiction, is too deeply stated to be now
shaken."
This ease coming up on appeal we must presume that defendant was properly summoned. The Pennsylvania Constitutional provision as to damages for negligence, art 3, sec 21: "No act of the
general assembly shall limit the amount to be recovered for injuries
resulting in death or for injuries to persons or property; and in

Dickinson Law Review
case of death from such injuries, the right of action shall survive, and the general assembly shall prescribe for whose benefit
such action shall be prosecuted. No act shall prescribe any limitation of time within which suits may be brought against corporations for injustice to persons or property, or for other causes, different from those fixed by general laws regulating action, or natural persons, and such acts now existing are avoided."
The act of April 1, 1851, P. L. 674. prescribes who shall prosecute such actions after the plaintiff's death; the act of April 26,
1855, prescribes for whose benefit an action shall be prosecuted
after the death of the person injured; the act of June 10, 1907, P. L.
523, 6 Purdon 7013, sec. 2, provides that "In all actions brought
to recover from an employer for injury by his employee, the negligence of a fellow servant of the employee shall not be a defense,
when the injury was caused or contributed to by any of the following causes; etc."
But the act of 1915 (Workmen's Compensation Act of 1915) puts
the workman in a better condition so far as the negligence of his
co-workman affected him; but so far as we are concerned it is
sufficient to note that it is a far more progressive piece of legislation than the Canadian Acts of this kind. However, this does
not affect the case at bar.
The general rule is, as to personal torts which give a right
of action at common law, that the action may be brought wherever
the wrongdoer may be found, and jurisdiction ex contractu, their
transitory character. and the jurisdiction of the courts that entertain them are the same whether the right be given by statute or
common law. The statute of another state has no extra territorial
force, but rights under it will always, in comity, be enforced if not
against the policy of the laws of the forum. In such case the law
of the place where the right was acquired or liability was incurred will govern as to the right of action, while all that pertains to remedy will be controlled by the law of the state where
the action is brought. Knight v. R. R. Co., 108 Pa. 250.
As a
general rule neither citizenship nor residence is requisite to entitle
a person to bring suit in Pennsylvania.
If a defendant were'not liable to enswer in a civil action in
any state where he may be found he could easily evade service of
process.
In our state the cases hold that our acts have extra territoiial
force. Patton v. Ry. Co., 96 Pa. 169; Knight v. R. R. Co., 108
Pa. 250; Usher v. R. R. Co., 126 Pa. 206; Derr v. R. R. Co., 158
Pa. 365.

Dickinson Law Review
An action may be maintained in the state against a foreign
corporation to recover damages in an action "ex delicto" for negligence causing death in another state, where a statute of such
state is similar to the Pennsylvania statute authorizing such an
action. Knight v. R. R. Co., 108 Pa. 250.
In Clark v. Best Mfg. Co., 243 Pa. 353, we find a case practically in point, the only difference being in the fact that the corporation was a domestic corporation. The action was trespass to
recover damages for personal injuries. It appeared that plaintiff
had been superintendent in fitting pipes, running through a concrete wall from an engine room into a tunnel.Plaintiff having been
directed by the superintendent to get into the tunnel, passed
through a pipe, which had been insecurely placed by defendant's
employees. While returning to the engine room at the direction of
the superintendent, the plaintiff attempted again to pass through
the pipe, when the section became overbalanced and fell several
feet to the floor of the tunnel, crushing and injuring him. It appeared that access to that portion of the tunnel might have been
had by a longer and less convenient way which was somewhat obstructed. The defendant company had had nothing to do' with laying the concrete wall. The trial judge charged the jury that by
the law of Ontario, where the accident occurred, if they found that
the injury resulted from the superintendent's negligence in supervising and directing the work, there could be no recovery unless
the defendant had failed to delegate to the superintendent the duty
of warning or instructing the employee, against a reasonably safe
place for its employees in which to work. The jury found a verdict
for plaintiff upon which judgment was entered, because of the
nonprovision of a safe place to work. In this case both parties
conceded that the liability of the defendant must be determined4 by
the law of Ontario, where the accident occurred. So the case is
a very simple one. The only question in the case is then, was
the jury right in determining that the en'ployer failed to furnish
a safe place to work? This was within the jury's province, and
from the facts submitted to them, we think, they were justified
in determining the point the way they did.
The trial court committed no error in their instructing of the
jury in the manner which they did.
Affirmed.

OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
The first instruction of the trial court was correct. It is
a general principle of the conflict of laws that the lex loci delicti
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governs the right of an injured party to sue for a tort, the liability
of the perpetrator and the defenses which he may plead.
This
rule has been applied in many cases where the liability of the defendant depended upon his responsibility for the negligence of a
fellow servant of the plaintiff and his duty to furnish the plaintiff a safe place in which to work. Minor on the Conflict of Laws,
Sec. 197; Clark v. Manufacturing Co., 243 Pa. 353; Wharton. on the
Conflict of Laws, 1101.
The second instruction was correct. The modern tendency is
to regard actions for torts as of a transitory nature, flot confined to the place where the tort occurs, and to support an action
for a foreign tort, if actionable by the law of the state where it
is committed regardless of the law of the forum.
The courts are
inclined to be very liberal in sustaining such actions. Minor on
Conflict of Laws, sec. 196; Usher v. Railroad, 106 Pa. 206; Wharton
on the Conflict of Laws 1093. An action similar to that in the
present case was allowed in Clark -. Manufacturing Co., 243 Pa.
353.
The third instruction was correct. The law having imposed
upon the master the duty of furnishing a safe place in which the
servant might work, his failure to provide such a place was a
legal fault or negligence.
It is well settled that a master is
liable for an injury to a servant which is caused by the concurring
negligence of the master and a fellow servant. 66 Cyc. 1302; Clark
v. Mfg. Co., 243 Pa. 353. In Kaiser v. Flaccus, 138 Pa. 332, it is
said, "The concurring negligence of a fellow servant with that of
the master will not relieve the master of liability."
Judgment affirmed.
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BOOK REVIEW
The Law of the Public School System of the United States,
by Harvey Cortlandt Voorhees. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company. 1916. pp. LVII, 429.
The author of this book is not unknown to the legal profession. His earlier work on "The Law of Arrest" has been used
by lawyers for many years and the recent publication of a new
edition of this work has given the profession an opportunity to
e~timate the present capability of the author. The opinion formed by the profession after reading the earlier work is vindicated
by the contents of the present volume.
It is the author's hope that his work will prove helpful to
the members of the legal profession and -to the "several hundred
thousand school officers" in the various states. That this hope
will be realized cannot be doubted.
Probably the book will
prove more useful to school officers who as a general rule, have
not access to law libraries than it will to lawyers, but it usefulness to the latter will be very great.
Among the subjects of great present day interest which are
treated are, compulsory education, religious garb of teachers, separate schools for colored children, secret societies, vaccination,
etc.
The mechanical features of the book are excellent.

